🔥🔥🔥 Theme Of Consequentialism In Minority Report
From Wikipedia, the Argumentative Essay On College Access encyclopedia. Each of these methods is intended Theme Of Consequentialism In Minority Report be an answer to the following question:. Theme Of Consequentialism In Minority Report D. A simple alignment of ideas of right and particular acts is not possible. Marketing ethics is also contested terrain, beyond the previously described issue of potential conflicts between profitability Theme Of Consequentialism In Minority Report other concerns. After the election, the money Theme Of Consequentialism In Minority Report is distributed on a pro rata basis to Theme Of Consequentialism In Minority Report voters.
Minority Report (OST) - Leo Crow, The Confrontation
Interesting that Francis uses an Apple iPhone. Labels: cold call , general audience , phone call , what the? The stamp was issued as one of four in the Interfaith Dialogue Efforts of Pope France series and is to celebrate the 9th year of Francis pontificate. Talmudic math which proves that the mitzvot are of Biblical origin just like the 10 Commandments, taken from cover of a book on the mitzvot. Labels: commandments , halakhic , insanity , Maimonides , Midrash , Moses , rabbi sifra , Rambam , stamp , synagogue , talmud , Talmudic Judaism , Vatican. Pius X. Labels: Abp. A: None other than the merchant of bigotry, name-calling, and Christ-denial himself.
Charles A. Older Posts Home. Subscribe to: Posts Atom. Pio X nella memoria del popolo dell'alta Slesia. Genealogy of the Sarto Family going back to the 15th century. Note that since a profile identifies the voter associated with each ballot, a voting method may take this information into account. A natural way to rule out these types of voting methods is to require that a voting method is anonymous : the group decision should depend only on the number of voters that chose each ballot. This means that if two profiles are permutations of each other, then a voting method that is anonymous must assign the same group decision to both profiles.
When studying voting methods that are anonymous, it is convenient to assume the inputs are anonymized profiles. The election scenario discussed in the previous section is an example of an anonymized profile assuming that each ranking not displayed in the table is assigned the number 0. In the remainder of this article unless otherwise specified , I will restrict attention to anonymized profiles. Two issues are important to keep in mind. Voters may choose a ballot that best expresses their personal preference about the set of candidates or their judgements about the relative strengths of the candidates. Second, it is important to be precise about the type of considerations voters take into account when selecting a ballot.
One approach is to assume that voters choose sincerely by selecting the ballot that best reflects their opinion about the the different candidates. A second approach assumes that the voters choose strategically. In this case, a voter selects a ballot that she expects to lead to her most desired outcome given the information she has about how the other members of the group will vote. Strategic voting is an important topic in voting theory and social choice theory see Taylor and Section 3. Section 4. A quick survey of elections held in different democratic societies throughout the world reveals a wide variety of voting methods. In this section, I discuss some of the key methods that have been analyzed in the voting theory literature.
These methods may be of interest because they are widely used e. Plurality Rule : Each voter selects one candidate or none if voters can abstain , and the candidate s with the most votes win. Plurality rule also called First Past the Post is a very simple method that is widely used despite its many problems. The most pervasive problem is the fact that plurality rule can elect a Condorcet loser.
Borda observed this phenomenon in the 18th century see also the example from Section 1. See Laslier for further criticisms of Plurality Rule and comparisons with other voting methods discussed in this article. One response to the above phenomenon is to require that candidates pass a certain threshold to be declared the winner. An important problem with quota rules is that they do not identify a winner in every election scenario.
A criticism of both plurality and quota rules is that they severely limit what voters can express about their opinions of the candidates. In the remainder of this section, I discuss voting methods that use ballots that are more expressive than simply selecting a single candidate. Section 2. Finally, Section 2. In this article, I focus on voting methods that either are familiar or help illustrate important ideas. Consult Brams and Fishburn , Felsenthal , and Nurmi for discussions of voting methods not covered in this article. The voting methods discussed in this section require the voters to rank the candidates see section 1. Providing a ranking of the candidates is much more expressive than simply selecting a single candidate. However, ranking all of the candidates can be very demanding, especially when there is a large number of them, since it can be difficult for voters to make distinctions between all the candidates.
Borda Count : Each voter provides a ranking of the candidates. Recall the example discussed in the introduction to Section 1. For each alternative, the Borda scores can be calculated using the above method:. Borda Count is an example of a scoring rule. Note that Plurality Rule can be viewed as a scoring rule that assigns 1 point to the first ranked candidate and 0 points to the other candidates. The first example of a multi-stage method is used to elect the French president. Plurality with Runoff : Start with a plurality vote to determine the top two candidates the candidates ranked first and second according to their plurality scores. If there is no candidate with a strict majority of first place votes, then there is a runoff between the top two candidates or more if there are ties.
The candidate s with the most votes in the runoff elections is are declared the winner s. Rather than focusing on the top two candidates, one can also iteratively remove the candidate s with the fewest first-place votes:. The Hare Rule : The ballots are rankings of the candidates. If there is no candidate with a strict majority of first place votes, repeatedly delete the candidate or candidates that receive the fewest first-place votes i.
The first candidate to be ranked first by strict majority of voters is declared the winner if there is no such candidate, then the remaining candidate s are declared the winners. If there are only three candidates, then the above two voting methods are the same removing the candidate with the lowest plurality score is the same as keeping the two candidates with highest and second-highest plurality score. The following example shows that they can select different winners when there are more than three candidates:. The core idea of multi-stage methods is to successively remove candidates that perform "poorly" in an election.
For the Hare Rule, performing poorly is interpreted as receiving the fewest first place votes. There are other ways to identify "poorly performing" candidates in an election scenario. For instance, the Coombs Rule successively removes candidates that are ranked last by the most voters see Grofman and Feld for an overview of Coombs Rule. Coombs Rule : The ballots are rankings of the candidates. If there is no candidate with a strict majority of first place votes, repeatedly delete the candidate or candidates that receive the most last-place votes. The first candidate to be ranked first by a strict majority of voters is declared the winner if there is no such candidate, then the remaining candidate s are declared the winners.
There is a technical issue that is important to keep in mind regarding the above definitions of the multi-stage voting methods. When identifying the poorly performing candidates in each round, there may be ties i. In the above definitions, I assume that all of the poorly performing candidates will be removed in each round. An alternative approach would use a tie-breaking rule to select one of the poorly performing candidates to be removed at each round.
The voting methods discussed in this section can be viewed as generalizations of scoring methods, such as Borda Count. Requiring voters to rank all the candidates means that 1 every candidate is assigned a grade, 2 there are the same number of possible grades as the number of candidates, and 3 different candidates must be assigned different grades.
In this section, we drop assumptions 2 and 3 , assuming a fixed number of grades for every set of candidates and allowing different candidates to be assigned the same grade. The first example gives voters the option to either select a candidate that they want to vote for as in plurality rule or to select a candidate that they want to vote against. Negative Voting : Each voter is allowed to choose one candidate to either vote for giving the candidate one point or to vote against giving the candidate —1 points. The winner s is are the candidate s with the highest total number of points i. That is, the voters are asked to choose a set of candidates that they support, where the choice is between sets consisting of a single candidate or sets consisting of all except one candidate.
The next voting method generalizes this idea by allowing voters to choose any subset of candidates:. Approval Voting : Each voter selects a subset of the candidates where the empty set means the voter abstains and the candidate s with selected by the most voters wins. Then, the approval winner is the candidate with the most approvals. See, also, the recent collection of articles devoted to approval voting Laslier and Sanver Approval voting forces voters to think about the decision problem differently: They are asked to determine which candidates they approve of rather than selecting a single candidate to voter for or determining the relative ranking of the candidates.
Ranking a set of candidates and selecting the candidates that are approved are two different aspects of a voters overall opinion about the candidates. They are related but cannot be derived from each other. See Brams and Sanver , for examples of voting methods that ask voters to both select a set of candidates that they approve and to linearly rank the candidates. Approval voting is a very flexible method. In fact, Brams , Chapter 2 proves that if there is a unique Condorcet winner, then that candidate may be elected under approval voting assuming that all voters vote sincerely : see Brams , Chapter 2, for a discussion.
Note that approval voting may also elect other candidates perhaps even the Condorcet loser. Whether this flexibility of Approval Voting should be seen as a virtue or a vice is debated in Brams, Fishburn and Merrill a, b and Saari and van Newenhizen a, b. Expanding on this idea, some voting methods assume that there is a fixed set of grades, or a grading language , that voters can assign to each candidate. See Chapters 7 and 8 from Balinksi and Laraki for examples and a discussion of grading languages cf. Morreau There are different ways to determine the winner s given a profile of ballots that assign grades to each candidate.
The main approach is to calculate a "group" grade for each candidate, then select the candidate with the best overall group grade. In order to calculate a group grade for each candidate, it is convenient to use numbers for the grading language. Then, there are two natural ways to determine the group grade for a candidate: calculating the mean, or average, of the grades or calculating the median of the grades. Cumulative Voting : Each voter is asked to distribute a fixed number of points, say ten, among the candidates in any way they please. The candidate s with the most total points wins the election. Score Voting also called Range Voting : The grades are a finite set of numbers. The ballots are an assignment of grades to the candidates.
The candidate s with the largest average grade is declared the winner s. Cumulative Voting and Score Voting are similar. The important difference is that Cumulative Voting requires that the sum of the grades assigned to the candidates by each voter is the same. The next procedure, proposed by Balinski and Laraki cf. Bassett and Persky and the discussion of this method at rangevoting. Majority Judgement : The grades are a finite set of numbers cf. The candidate s with the largest median grade is are declared the winner s. See Balinski and Laraki and for further refinements of this voting method that use different methods for breaking ties when there are multiple candidates with the largest median grade.
I conclude this section with an example that illustrates Score Voting and Majority Judgement. The table below describes an election scenario. The candidates are listed in the first row. Each row describes an assignment of grades to a candidate by a set of voters. The bottom two rows give the mean and median grade for each candidate. There are two types of debates about the voting methods introduced in this section. The first concerns the choice of the grading language that voters use to evaluate the candidates. Consult Balinski and Laraki amd Morreau for an extensive discussion of the types of considerations that influence the choice of a grading language.
Brams and Potthoff argue that two grades, as in Approval Voting, is best to avoid certain paradoxical outcomes. The second type of debate concerns the method used to calculate the group grade for each candidate i. One important issue is whether voters have an incentive to misrepresent their evaluations of the candidates. Thus, this voter has an incentive to misrepresent her grades. Note that the median grades for the candidates do not change after this voter changes her grades. Indeed, Balinski and Laraki , chapter 10, argue that using the median to assign group grades to candidates encourages voters to submit grades that reflect their true evaluations of the candidates.
Thus, if voters are focused on ensuring that the group grades for the candidates best reflects their true evaluations of the candidates, then voters do not have an incentive to misrepresent their grades. However, as pointed out in Felsenthal and Machover Example 3. In this section, I briefly discuss two new approaches to voting that do not fit nicely into the categories of voting methods introduced in the previous sections. While both of these methods can be used to select representatives, such as a president, the primary application is a group of people voting directly on propositions, or referendums.
Indeed, when there are only two alternatives, such as when voting for or against a proposition, there are many arguments that identify majority rule as the best and most stable group decision method May ; Maskin One well-known problem with always selecting the majority winner is the so-called tyranny of the majority. A complete discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this article. The main problem from the point of view of the analysis of voting methods is that there may be situations in which a majority of the voters weakly support a proposition while there is a sizable minority of voters that have a strong preference against the proposition. One way of dealing with this problem is to increase the quota required to accept a proposition.
However, this gives too much power to a small group of voters. For instance, with Unanimity Rule a single voter can block a proposal from being accepted. Arguably, a better solution is to use ballots that allow voters to express something about their intensity of preference for the alternatives. Setting aside issues about interpersonal comparisons of utility see, for instance, Hausman , this is the benefit of using the voting methods discussed in Section 2. These voting methods assume that there is a fixed set of grades that the voters use to express their intensity of preference. One challenge is finding an appropriate set of grades for a population of voters. Too few grades makes it harder for a sizable minority with strong preferences to override the majority opinion, but too many grades makes it easy for a vocal minority to overrule the majority opinion.
Using ideas from mechanism design Groves and Ledyard ; Hylland and Zeckhauser , the economist E. Glen Weyl developed a voting method called Quadratic Voting that mitigates some of the above issues Lalley and Weyl a. The idea is to think of an election as a market Posner and Weyl, , Chapter 2. Each voter can purchase votes at a costs that is quadratic in the number of votes. After the election, the money collected is distributed on a pro rata basis to the voters.
See Posner and Weyl and for further discussion and a vigorous defense of the use of Quadratic Voting in national elections. Consult Laurence and Sher for two arguments against the use of Quadratic Voting. Both arguments are derived from the presence of wealth inequality. The first argument is that it is ambiguous whether the Quadratic Voting decision really outperforms a decision using majority rule from the perspective of utilitarianism see Driver and Sinnott-Armstrong for overviews of utilitarianism.
The second argument is that any vote-buying mechanism will have a hard time meeting a legitimacy requirement, familiar from the theory of democratic institutions cf. Fabienne For instance, a voter may have been elected to represent a constituency, or a voter may be recognized as an expert on the issue under consideration. An alternative approach to group decision making is direct democracy in which every citizen is asked to vote on every political issue.
Asking the citizens to vote on every issue faces a number of challenges, nicely explained by Green-Armytage , pg. One way to deal with some of the problems raised in the above quote is to use proxy voting , in which voters can delegate their vote on some issues Miller Liquid Democracy is a form of proxy voting in which voters can delegate their votes to other voters ideally, to voters that are well-informed about the issue under consideration. What distinguishes Liquid Democracy from proxy voting is that proxies may further delegate the votes entrusted to them.
For example, suppose that there is a vote to accept or reject a proposition. Each voter is given the option to delegate their vote to another voter, called a proxy. The proxies, in turn, are given the option to delegate their votes to yet another voter. The voters that decide to not transfer their votes cast a vote weighted by the number of voters who entrusted them as a proxy, either directly or indirectly. While there has been some discussion of proxy voting in the political science literature Miller ; Alger ; Green-Armytage , most studies of Liquid Democracy can be found in the computer science literature.
A notable exception is Blum and Zuber that justifies Liquid Democracy, understood as a procedure for democratic decision-making, within normative democratic theory. An overview of the origins of Liquid Democracy and pointers to other online discussions can be found in Behrens Formal studies of Liquid Democracy have focused on: the possibility of delegation cycles and the relationship with the theory of judgement aggregation Christoff and Grossi ; the rationality of delegating votes Bloembergen, Grossi and Lackner ; the potential problems that arise when many voters delegate votes to only a few voters Kang et al.
This section introduced different methods for making a group decision. One striking fact about the voting methods discussed in this section is that they can identify different winners given the same collection of ballots. This raises an important question: How should we compare the different voting methods? Can we argue that some voting methods are better than others? There are a number of different criteria that can be used to compare and contrast different voting methods:.
In this section, I introduce and discuss a number of voting paradoxes — i. Consult Saari and Nurmi for penetrating analyses that explain the underlying mathematics behind the different voting paradoxes. A very common assumption is that a rational preference ordering must be transitive i. Many authors argue that voters with cyclic preference orderings have inconsistent opinions about the candidates and should be ignored by a voting method in particular, Condorcet forcefully argued this point. A key observation of Condorcet which has become known as the Condorcet Paradox is that the majority ordering may have cycles even when all the voters submit rankings of the alternatives.
This means that there is no Condorcet winner. This simple, but fundamental observation has been extensively studied Gehrlein ; Schwartz The Condorcet Paradox shows that there may not always be a Condorcet winner in an election. However, one natural requirement for a voting method is that if there is a Condorcet winner, then that candidate should be elected. Voting methods that satisfy this property are called Condorcet consistent. Many of the methods introduced above are not Condorcet consistent. I already presented an example showing that plurality rule is not Condorcet consistent in fact, plurality rule may even elect the Condorcet loser. The example from Section 1 shows that Borda Count is not Condorcet consistent.
Consider the following voting situation with 81 voters and three candidates from Condorcet Using the Borda rule, we have:. To simplify the calculation, assume that candidates ranked last receive 0 points i. But, of course, it is counterintuitive to give more points for being ranked second than for being ranked first. Peter Fishburn generalized this example as follows:. Theorem Fishburn So, no scoring rule is Condorcet consistent, but what about other methods?
A number of voting methods were devised specifically to guarantee that a Condorcet winner will be elected, if one exists. The examples below give a flavor of different types of Condorcet consistent methods. See Brams and Fishburn, , and Fishburn, , for more examples and a discussion of Condorcet consistent methods. If there is a Condorcet winner, then that candidate wins the election. Otherwise, all candidates tie for the win. If there is a Condorcet winner, then that candidate is the winner. Otherwise, use Borda Count to determine the winners. Calculate the Borda score for each candidate. The candidates with a Borda score below the average of the Borda scores are eliminated. The Borda scores of the candidates are re-calculated and the process continues until there is only one candidate remaining.
See Niou, , for a discussion of this voting method. The winners are the smallest set of candidates that are not beaten in a one-on-one election by any candidate outside the set Schwartz The candidate s with the fewest swaps is are declared the winner s. The last method was proposed by Charles Dodgson better known by the pseudonym Lewis Carroll. Interestingly, this is an example of a procedure in which it is computationally difficult to compute the winner that is, the problem of calculating the winner is NP-complete. See Bartholdi et al. These voting methods and the other Condorcet consistent methods guarantee that a Condorcet winner, if one exists, will be elected. But, should a Condorcet winner be elected? Many people argue that there is something amiss with a voting method that does not always elect a Condorcet winner if one exists.
The idea is that a Condorcet winner best reflects the overall group opinion and is stable in the sense that it will defeat any challenger in a one-on-one contest using Majority Rule. The most persuasive argument that the Condorcet winner should not always be elected comes from the work of Donald Saari , The majority ordering is. Groups 1 and 2 constitute majority cycles with the voters evenly distributed among the three possible rankings. Such profiles are called Condorcet components. These profiles form a perfect symmetry among the rankings. Balinski and Laraki , pgs. Balinski and Laraki , pg. See the discussion of the multiple districts paradox in Section 3.
A voting method is monotonic provided that receiving more support from the voters is always better for a candidate. There are different ways to make this idea precise see Fishburn, , Sanver and Zwicker, , and Felsenthal and Tideman, It is easy to see that Plurality Rule is monotonic in this sense: The more voters that rank a candidate first, the better chance the candidate has to win. Surprisingly, there are voting methods that do not satisfy this natural property.
The most well-known example is Plurality with Runoff. Consider the two scenarios below. Note that the only difference between the them is the ranking of the fourth group of voters. See Felsenthal and Nurmi for further discussion of voting methods that are not monotonic. In this section, I discuss two related paradoxes that involve changes to the population of voters. Voting methods that do not satisfy this version of monotonicity are said to be susceptible to the no-show paradox Fishburn and Brams Suppose that there are 3 candidates and 11 voters with the following rankings:. Suppose that 2 voters in the first group do not show up to the election:. Plurality with Runoff is not the only voting method that is susceptible to the no-show paradox.
The Coombs Rule, Hare Rule and Majority Judgement using the tie-breaking mechanism from Balinski and Laraki are all susceptible to the no-show paradox. Sunstein, Voluntary Agreements , J. Methodology forthcoming Sub-Categories: Contracts. In philosophy, economics, and law, the idea of voluntary agreements plays a central role. It orients contractarian approaches to political legitimacy. It also helps support the claim that outsiders, and especially the state, should not interfere with private contracts.
But contractarianism in political philosophy stands or falls on altogether different grounds from enthusiasm for contractual ordering in economics and law. When participants in voluntary agreements lack information or suffer from behavioral biases including adaptive preferences , there is reason to help them, potentially through mandates and bans. Chevron, U. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. Several members of the Supreme Court have suggested that they would like to overrule it. Under standard principles of stare decisis, doing that would be a serious mistake. Even if Chevron was wrongly decided, overruling it would create an upheaval—a large shock to the legal system, producing a great deal of confusion, more conflicts in the courts of appeals, and far greater politicization of administrative law.
For example: What would happen to the countless regulations that have been upheld under the Chevron framework? Would they be newly vulnerable? More fundamentally,, a predictable effect of overruling Chevron would be to ensure a far greater role for judicial policy preferences in statutory interpretation and far more common splits along ideological lines. Though the argument for overruling Chevron is unconvincing, its critics have legitimate concerns. Those concerns should be addressed by 1 insisting on a fully independent judicial role in deciding whether a statute is ambiguous at Step One; 2 invalidating arbitrary or unreasonable agency interpretations at Step Two; and 3 deploying canons of construction, including those that are designed to serve nondelegation functions and thus to cabin executive authority.
The result would not quite be Zombie Chevron, but it would be close to that, and the most reasonable path forward. In Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, the Supreme Court took a highly aggressive approach to restrictions imposed by the state of New York on houses of worship, even though those restrictions were vigorously defended on public health grounds. Because of the serious health effects of the COVID pandemic, and because of the plausibility of a plea for judicial respect for complex choices and tradeoffs by elected officials, Roman Catholic Diocese can reasonably be seen as a kind of anti-Korematsu — that is, as a strong signal of judicial solicitude for constitutional rights, and of judicial willingness to protect against discrimination, even under emergency circumstances in which life is on the line.
Nonetheless, there are two open questions. The first is how to think about claims of discrimination in the context of actual and potentially challenging questions about the appropriate comparator, that is, the institutions that are best seen as comparable to houses of worship, in terms of the health risks that they create. Sub-Categories: Social Welfare Law. In the current work, we critically reflect on recent efforts to proxy the welfare impact of nudges using willingness to pay and subjective wellbeing reports and explore an alternative unobtrusive approach: automatic facial expression coding.
The information does not, however, affect the emotions people go on to experience while viewing movie clips, suggesting that the emotional effects of the information are short-lived. We conclude by emphasising the potential of automatic facial expression coding to provide new insights into the short-run welfare effects of nudges and calling for further research into this promising technique. Sunstein, Algorithms as Discrimination Detectors , Proc. Nat'l Acad. Sub-Categories: Discrimination.
This paper results from the Arthur M. Preventing discrimination requires that we have means of detecting it, and this can be enormously difficult when human beings are making the underlying decisions. As applied today, algorithms can increase the risk of discrimination. But as we argue here, algorithms by their nature require a far greater level of specificity than is usually possible with human decision making, and this specificity makes it possible to probe aspects of the decision in additional ways. With the right changes to legal and regulatory systems, algorithms can thus potentially make it easier to detect—and hence to help prevent—discrimination.
Sunstein , Behavioral Science and Public Policy By contrast, the strong version flatly prohibits agencies from interpreting ambiguous statutes so as to assert broad authority over the private sector. Both versions of the major question doctrine can claim a connection to the nondelegation doctrine. The arguments on behalf of the weak version are very different from the arguments on behalf of the strong version. Sunstein, On Overruling Chevron Nov. Sunstein, Hayekian Behavioral Economics Oct. Like John Stuart Mill, Friedrich Hayek also offered an epistemic argument on behalf of freedom of choice. He emphasized that outsiders know much less than choosers do, which means that interferences with personal freedom, by those outsiders, will make choosers worse off.
A contemporary challenge to that epistemic argument comes from behavioral economics, which has uncovered an assortment of reasons why choosers err, and also pointed to possible distortions in the price system. But even if those findings are accepted, what should outsiders do? How should they proceed? A neo-Hayekian approach would seek to reduce the knowledge problem by asking not what outsiders want, but what individual choosers actually do under epistemically favorable conditions.
In practice, that question can be disciplined by asking five subsidiary questions: 1 What do consistent choosers, unaffected by self-evidently irrelevant factors, end up choosing? These kinds of questions can be answered empirically. These conclusions are illustrated with reference to the controversy over fuel economy standards, with an acknowledgement that on broadly Hayekian grounds, the best approach might be to inform consumers of potential savings, while using a corrective tax to control externalities.
Sunstein, Marvelous Belief , L. Books Sept. In a short burst of creativity in the early s, Lee created most of his iconic characters, and changed popular culture in the process. An International Survey Sept. What information would people like to have? What information would they prefer to avoid? How does the provision of information bear on welfare? Representative surveys in eleven nations find that substantial percentages of people do not want to receive information even when it bears on health, sustainability, and consumer welfare.
We develop a model and estimate the welfare effects. We find substantial benefits and costs, with the former outweighing the latter. How much information is too much? Do we need to know how many calories are in the giant vat of popcorn that we bought on our way into the movie theater? Do we want to know if we are genetically predisposed to a certain disease? Can we do anything useful with next week's weather forecast for Paris if we are not in Paris? Sunstein argues that the information on warnings and mandatory labels is often confusing or irrelevant, yielding no benefit. He finds that people avoid information if they think it will make them sad and seek information they think will make them happy.
Our information avoidance and information seeking is notably heterogeneous—some of us do want to know the popcorn calorie count, others do not. Of course, says Sunstein, we are better off with stop signs, warnings on prescriptions drugs, and reminders about payment due dates. But sometimes less is more. What we need is more clarity about what information is actually doing or achieving. Sunstein, Freerolls July 27, When policymakers focus on costs and benefits, they often find that hard questions become easy — as, for example, when the benefits clearly exceed the costs, or when the costs clearly exceed the benefits.
In some cases, however, benefits or costs are difficult to quantify, perhaps because of limitations in scientific knowledge. In extreme cases, policymakers are proceeding in circumstances of uncertainty rather than risk, in the sense that they cannot assign probabilities to various outcomes. In terms of regulatory policy, one of the most promising defenses of the Precautionary Principle sees it as a kind of freeroll. Some responses to climate change, pandemics, and financial crises can be seen as near-freerolls. Freerolls and near-freerolls must be distinguished from cases involving cumulatively high costs and also from faux freerolls, which can be found when the costs of an option are real and significant, but not visible.
Some regulatory options are binds, and there are faux binds as well. Lawrence B. Sunstein, Chevron as Construction , Cornell L. In , the Supreme Court declared that courts should uphold agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions, so long as those interpretations are reasonable. The Chevron framework, as it is called, is now under serious pressure. Current debates can be both illuminated and softened with reference to an old distinction between interpretation on the one hand and construction on the other. In cases of interpretation, judges or agencies must ascertain the meaning of a statutory term.
In cases of construction, judges or agencies must develop implementing principles or specify a statutory term. In cases that involve statutory construction, the argument on behalf of Chevron is very powerful; agencies have relevant comparative advantages in developing implementing principles. With respect to statutory interpretation, the argument on behalf of Chevron is more controversial. Those who reject Chevron in the context of interpretation should nonetheless accept it in the context of construction. The distinction between interpretation and construction explains some important cases in the s and also in the post-Chevron era.
Sunstein, Maximin , 37 Yale J. For regulation, some people argue in favor of the maximin rule, by which public officials seek to eliminate the worst worst-cases. The maximin rule has not played a formal role in regulatory policy in the Unites States, but in the context of climate change or new and emerging technologies, regulators who are unable to conduct standard cost-benefit analysis might be drawn to it. In general, the maximin rule is a terrible idea for regulatory policy, because it is likely to reduce rather than to increase well-being.
But under four imaginable conditions, that rule is attractive. It may be possible to combine 3 and 4. With respect to 3 and 4 , the challenges arise when eliminating dangers also threatens to impose very high costs or to eliminate very large gains. Miracles may present a mirror-image of worst-case scenarios. Sunstein, Behavioral Welfare Economics , 11 J. Benefit-Cost Analysis This work has strong implications for economic analysis of law, cost—benefit analysis, and regulatory policy. The working presumption should itself be rebuttable on welfare grounds, with an understanding that the ends that people choose might make their lives go less well. For example, people might die prematurely or suffer from serious illness, and what they receive in return might not on any plausible account of welfare be nearly enough.
The underlying reason might involve a lack of information or a behavioral bias, identifiable or not, in which case intervention can fit with the working presumption, but the real problem might involve philosophical questions about the proper understanding of welfare, and about what it means for people to have a good life. Sunstein, The Siren of Selfishness , N. Books , Apr. Sunstein, Falsehoods and the First Amendment , 33 Harv. What is the constitutional status of falsehoods? From the standpoint of the First Amendment, does truth or falsity matter? In , the Supreme Court ruled for the first time that intentional falsehoods are protected by the First Amendment, at least when they do not cause serious harm. But in important ways, seems like a generation ago, and the Court has yet to give an adequate explanation for its conclusion.
But that is hardly the only reason to protect falsehoods, intentional or otherwise; there are several others. Even so, these arguments suffer from abstraction and high-mindedness; they do not amount to decisive reasons to protect falsehoods. These propositions are applied to old questions involving defamation and to new questions involving fake news, deepfakes, and doctored videos. It emerges that New York Times v. Sullivan is an anachronism, and that it should be rethought in light of current technologies and new findings in behavioral science. It also emerges that Facebook, Twitter, and other social media platforms should do far more than they are now doing to control falsehoods, deepfakes, and doctored videos.
The order has two laudable ambitions: to reduce the stock of existing regulations and to stem the flow of new regulations. But because it entirely ignores the benefits of regulations and focuses only on costs, it is a singularly crude instrument for achieving those goals. In both theory and practice, it threatens to impose large net costs including significant increases in mortality and morbidity. A third goal, no less important than 1 and 2 , should be a very high priority, which is to produce institutional mechanisms to promote issuance of regulations that would have high net benefits including reductions in mortality and morbidity. Congress, courts, and the executive branch should take steps to combat benefit neglect.
Geoffrey R. Stone , Louis M. Seidman , Cass R. Sunstein , Mark V. Categories: Environmental Law. It is standard to think that corrective taxes, responding to externalities, are generally or always better than regulatory mandates, but in the face of behavioral market failures, that conclusion might not be right. Fuel economy and energy efficiency mandates are possible examples.
Because such mandates might produce billions of dollars in annual consumer savings, they might have very high net benefits, complicating the choice between such mandates and externality-correcting taxes such as carbon taxes. The net benefits of mandates that simultaneously reduce internalities and externalities might exceed the net benefits of taxes that reduce externalities alone, even if mandates turn out to be a highly inefficient way of reducing externalities. An important qualification is that corrective taxes might be designed to reduce both externalities and internalities, in which case they would almost certainly be preferable to a regulatory mandate.
The American administrative state has become, in important respects, a cost-benefit state. At least this is so in the sense that prevailing executive orders require agencies to proceed only if the benefits justify the costs. For defenders of the cost-benefit state, the antonym of their ideal is, alternately, regulation based on dogmas, intuitions, expressivism, or interest-group power. The focus on costs and benefits is an important effort to attend to the real-world consequences of regulations — and it casts a pragmatic, skeptical light on modern objections to the administrative state, invoking public-choice theory and the supposed self-serving decisions of unelected bureaucrats.
In the future, however, there will be better ways to identify those consequences, by focusing directly on welfare, and not relying on imperfect proxies. Sunstein, Sludge Audits , Behav. Pol'y Jan. Because of behavioral biases and cognitive scarcity, sludge can have much more harmful effects than private and public institutions anticipate. To protect consumers, investors, employees, and others, firms, universities, and government agencies should regularly conduct Sludge Audits to catalogue the costs of sludge, and to decide when and how to reduce it. Much of human life is unnecessarily sludgy. Sludge often has costs far in excess of benefits, and it can have hurt the most vulnerable members of society.
Categories: Consumer Finance. Do consumers benefit from mandatory labels? How much? These questions are difficult to answer, because assessment of the costs and benefits of labels presents serious challenges. All of these approaches run into serious normative, conceptual, and empirical objections. Approach 3 will exaggerate what consumers gain, because many people suffer welfare losses when they see labels, whether or not they end up making different choices. These points raise fundamental conceptual, normative, and empirical questions about welfarist approaches to public policy.
Karlan , Constitutional Law: Supplement The Annual Supplement, like prior Supplements, includes excerpts from recent scholarship and from important new decisions of the Supreme Court. This was a most interesting Term, and several of the new decisions that are covered in the Annual Supplement are listed below. New to the supplement: Trump v. Vance Espinoza v. Montana June Medical Services v. Russo Seila Law v. Morissey-Berra Chiafalo v. Washington Little Sisters of the Poor v. Michael Greenstone, Cass R.
Sub-Categories: Transportation Law. Motor vehicle fuel-economy standards have long been a cornerstone of U. In , following a review of the standards, the Environmental Protection Agency and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration proposed instead to freeze the standards at levels, citing high program costs and potential safety issues. The current debate over the future of U. The current policy prescribes standards that focus on fuel economy alone, as opposed to lifetime consumption, and treats vehicle categories differentially, meaning that it imposes unnecessarily high costs and does not deliver guaranteed GHG savings.
On the basis of a commitment to cost-benefit analysis, which has defined U. We show that these reforms would reduce fuel consumption and GHG emissions in transportation with greater certainty and do so at a far lower cost per ton of GHG emissions avoided. We also show that the the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Transportation could implement such an approach within their existing statutory authority. Sunstein, Has Liberalism Ruined Everything? Theory There is good reason for skepticism about these claims. Liberalism is not a person, and it is not an agent in history. Claims about the supposedly adverse social effects of liberalism are best taken not as causal claims at all, but as normative objections that should be defended on their merits.
Public opinion is shaped in significant part by online content, spread via social media and curated algorithmically. The current online ecosystem has been designed predominantly to capture user attention rather than to promote deliberate cognition and autonomous choice; information overload, finely tuned personalization and distorted social cues, in turn, pave the way for manipulation and the spread of false information. How can transparency and autonomy be promoted instead, thus fostering the positive potential of the web? Effective web governance informed by behavioural research is critically needed to empower individuals online. We identify technologically available yet largely untapped cues that can be harnessed to indicate the epistemic quality of online content, the factors underlying algorithmic decisions and the degree of consensus in online debates.
We then map out two classes of behavioural interventions—nudging and boosting— that enlist these cues to redesign online environments for informed and autonomous choice. Immense amounts of information are now accessible to people, including information that bears on their past, present and future. An important research challenge is to determine how people decide to seek or avoid information. Here we propose a framework of information-seeking that aims to integrate the diverse motives that drive information-seeking and its avoidance.
The suggestion is that people assess these influences and integrate them into a calculation of the value of information that leads to information-seeking or avoidance. The theory offers a framework for characterizing and quantifying individual differences in information-seeking, which we hypothesize may also be diagnostic of mental health. We consider biases that can lead to both insufficient and excessive information-seeking. We also discuss how the framework can help government agencies to assess the welfare effects of mandatory information disclosure. Sunstein, How Special is Democracy? Letters Previous research has, however, suggested that such institutions can also have a direct, positive effect on cooperative and efficient behavior.
In a laboratory experiment, we test this suggestion by comparing the effect of recommendations on how to play that are generated through a group vote to expert-generated recommendations, on play in a minimum effort game. We find no difference between the two: both expert recommendations and democratically generated recommendations increase the efficiency of choices. In addition, we find that merely considering potential recommendations, and knowing that others have done so as well, can help enhance efficient coordination.
Many Americans fear the power of unelected, unaccountable bureaucrats — the deep state. The administrative state may be a Leviathan, but it can be a principled one. Gosset, Optimal Sludge? Online Public officials often impose eligibility requirements that have two effects: 1 they screen out ineligible people and 2 they screen out eligible people. In these circumstances, there is a pervasive normative issue: what is the optimal tradeoff between 1 and 2? It is plausible to think that a great deal depends on numbers. If, for example, the number of ineligible people who are screened out is very large, and if the number of eligible people who are screened out is very small, then there would seem little ground for objection.Theme Of Consequentialism In Minority Report All Filters. One criticism comes from Theme Of Consequentialism In Minority Report Benedict by describing the Narrative Essay On Three Kids And A Kitten effects of the real economy of Theme Of Consequentialism In Minority Report managed and largely speculative financial dealing. When delegating your Theme Of Consequentialism In Minority Report to one of our writers, Theme Of Consequentialism In Minority Report can be sure that we will:. The first advantages of smartphones of the course looks at issues related to the sale Theme Of Consequentialism In Minority Report goods, Theme Of Consequentialism In Minority Report as implied terms, transfer of property and title disputes with third parties. That Theme Of Consequentialism In Minority Report why they are unfree. Then, the candidate with the largest score is declared the winner. Meta-ethics Meta-ethics is the branch of ethics that seeks to Theme Of Consequentialism In Minority Report the nature of ethical properties, statements, attitudes, and judgments.